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We investigate the impact of health expenditure on health outcomes on a large sample 
of Europeans aged above 50 on individual and country level data. We find a 
significant negative impact on changes in the number of chronic diseases which varies 
according to age, health styles, gender, income and education subgroups. Our findings 
indicate potentially heterogeneous support to health expenditure across interest groups 
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1.1 Introduction and motivation to our research 
 
We investigate the impact of domestic health expenditure on objective health 
indicators in order to check how much this fundamental country specific health 
variable matters in determining the health of nations. The issue is of paramount 
importance in a historical phase in which low fertility rates, ageing population, 
endangered public debt sustainability and high costs of many new drugs which reduce 
mortality (e.g. new drugs to cure leukaemias) are all factors contributing to an 
increase in the demand of health expenditure in a framework of shirking public 
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resources. In this framework the identification of the exact relevance of this crucial 
factor affecting active ageing and its heterogeneous impact on different population 
groups may be crucial to tackle the challenge of improving health outcomes without 
endangering government debt sustainability.  
Health expenditure represents one of the largest government expenditure items (6 
percent of GDP in the OECD area, Joumard et al., 2010) and one of the most 
important drivers of health politically determined at country level. Nixon and Ullman 
(2006) find a significant and positive effect of health expenditure on health outcomes 
in EU countries and show that, between 1980 and 1995, health care expenditure and 
the number of physicians have added respectively 2.6 and 1.6 years to male life 
expectancy and reduced by 0.63 and 0.22 percent the infant mortality rate. Along this 
line Or (2000) documents that a high share of public expenditure is associated with 
lower premature mortality and infant and perinatal mortality, even though not 
affecting life expectancy at 65 or heart diseases.  Other authors (Hitiris and Posnett, 
1992) find that mortality is negatively related to per capita health expenditure but its 
economic significance is limited (an elasticity between 0.08 and 0.06). The same 
authors find that per capita health care expenditure may explain more the variance in 
infant mortality than would per capita GDP and is inversely correlated to female 
premature mortality, while positively correlated to female life expectancy (Elola et 
al., 1995). Conversely, a lower number of physicians and cuts in health care 
expenditure are associated with increased infant mortality, reduced life expectancy at 
age 65 and lower heart diseases. In particular, a 10 percent cut in health care 
expenditure is associated with a 6 month reduction in life expectancy for men and 3 
month reduction for women (Crémieux et al., 1999 and Or, 2000). 
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These mixed findings clearly imply that the driving factor is not just the magnitude of 
health expenditure but also its quality and efficiency. Concerning the later, Joumard et 
al. (2010) estimate that life expectancy at birth could be raised by more than two 
years on average, holding health care spending constant, if all countries were to 
become as efficient as the best performers. On the other hand, a 10 percent increase in 
health care spending would increase life expectancy by only three to four months if 
the distance from the efficient frontier remains unchanged. The same literature 
generally finds that institutional variables for funding arrangements are often not 
significant, with some exceptions: countries with fee-for-service at the hospital level 
tend to have lower premature mortality (but no longer life expectancy at 65) (Or, 
2000). 
 
1.2 The specific contribution of our approach in the literature 
 
As shown above the empirical literature tends to test the impact of health expenditure 
with country level aggregate data looking at health outcomes such as mortality and 
longevity including, among others, life expectancy at a given age, premature mortality 
and infant mortality. However this approach could be usefully complemented with an 
analysis on diseases’ insurgence, especially in the economic perspective which is 
primarily concerned about the effects of health on human capital and National Health 
Service (NHS) expenditure. These effects are crucially determined by morbidity and 
not just mortality. The point is clearly remarked by Nixon and Ullman (2006) who 
emphasize that the standard macroeconomic variables used as health outputs in the 
literature (infant mortality and life expectancy) have relevant limitations. First, they 
do not vary much in high income countries and second they are determined not only 
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by factors related to health care systems. Moreover, a disease-based approach is 
conceptually more attractive than generic mortality and longevity measures because it 
also accounts for health gains due to specific treatments (Joumard et al., 2008). This is 
why we deem relevant to focus on the number of chronic diseases as synthetic health 
outcome indicator in our empirical research.  
A second element of originality in our approach in addition to the focus on morbidity 
is the use of individual data provided that, as is well known, beyond the quality of 
health care systems, mortality, longevity and various disease outcomes are affected by 
variables at individual level such as standard socio-demographic drivers (gender, 
education, income, family status), health styles (diet, physical activity, alcohol 
consumption and smoking consumption) and the concurrent individual health status 
which must be controlled for. According to Thornton (2002) the role of 
socioeconomic factors and life styles in preventing diseases and improving life 
expectancy is much more significant than medical care, even though we argue that 
national health care policies may also include prevention campaigns which are likely 
to affect lifestyle factors. In particular, smoking, sport activities and obesity explain 
why some countries achieve better health status than others while using comparable 
levels of health care resources (Afonso and St Aubyn, 2006). Another factor which 
has been acknowledged as having a crucial role on health is education. As is well 
known more educated individuals are modelled as having “higher productivity” in 
combining market and non market inputs to produce health outcomes (in the 
productive theory) and choose better combinations of inputs (especially health styles 
and doctor advice) to obtain such results (in the allocative theory) (Grossman, 2006; 
Feinstein et al., 2006). Joumard et al. (2010) calculate that education contributed to a 
gain of 0.5 years in life expectancy at birth for females out of a total improvement of 
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2.49 between 1991 and 2003, while health care expenditure contributes for 1.14. 
Similar results are found for males.  
Among other factors, occupation is also important for health status, not only in terms 
of exposure to specific workplace risks, but mainly due to its role in positioning 
people along a society's hierarchy (Blas and Kurup, 2010). In particular, it is shown 
how work opportunities and work conditions for females affect socioeconomic status 
and, as a consequence, have an impact on behavioural and environmental risk factors 
for breast cancer in women (National Cancer Institute, 2011). 
The use of individual level data is important not only for what considered above but 
also because it enables to more properly consider that part of individual variability 
which is lost when just looking at aggregate country level data. Country level 
estimates are in general based on correlations across mean country values which do 
not take into account that other centiles of the distribution may have more relevance 
when dealing with health matters (i.e. more extreme percentiles in life styles such as 
intense drinking, smoking and obesity definitely have stronger impact on health 
outcomes than mean values). This is why matching inputs and outputs for each 
individual (and checking the effect of specific combinations of socio-demographic 
factors on health for each individual) may provide more accurate results than just 
considering average socio-demographic factors for each country.1  
A third further advantage of our approach combining individual and country level 
data is that it allows to test whether the health expenditure effect on health outcomes 
                                                        
1 Imagine a sample with two overweight individuals whose weight causes the insurgence of pathologies 
and two slightly underweight individuals with good health. Individual data would clearly identify the 
link between obesity and health while aggregate country level evidence would cancel out the effect. 
Imagine to have similar samples for individuals in other countries and years. The ignorance of the 
overweight-health effect would as well make less clear the impact of country level data such as 
health/GDP expenditure. The same could occur for drinking or smoking. While in some cases we may 
have some limited aggregate coverage on the share of individuals in tails of life styles this is not always 
the case for panel data with many countries and repeated years.  
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changes if we consider different population groups given that aggregate country level 
time series on health outcomes for age, gender and health style groups are hardly 
available. By comparing the impact of health expenditure in different subsamples we 
may identify specific constituencies (i.e. based on gender, income, education)  which 
are more sensitive to health expenditure policies and specific health styles which can 
be improved (i.e. diet, physical activity) reducing health expenditure without negative 
effect on health outcomes. The three advantages in using individual data described 
above are not traded-off with any loss since, when starting from individual data, it is 
always possible (as we do in our research) to collapse observations at territorial unit 
levels in order to check whether findings are significant also when aggregated. 
 
Taking into account what considered above the goal of our paper is to measure the 
impact of health expenditure to GDP and health expenditure per capita on objective 
health and morbidity indicators after controlling for standard socio-demographic 
factors, health styles and a measure of health quality at NUTS level on a large sample 
of Europeans aged above 50.   
The paper is divided into four sections. In the second section we illustrate descriptive 
statistics of our sample. In the third section we present our econometric findings for 
the overall sample and for specific (age, education, life style) subsamples while 
testing their robustness with IV estimates. Then we provide robustness checks and 
control whether our main findings remain robust when re-estimated with data 
collapsed at territorial level. The fourth section concludes. 
 
2.1  Database, variables and summary descriptive findings  
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We use cross-national panel data from the first, second and fourth wave of the Survey 
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) implemented in 2004, 2006 
and 2010 respectively. We remove the third wave (SHARELIFE) since it is a 
retrospective survey of people life history and therefore it is not consistent with our 
study. The database contains information on health, socio-economic status, and social 
and family networks of a sample of Europeans aged above 50. More specifically the 
SHARE survey is composed by 19 country level representative samples for the 
following countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, 
Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, Czech Republic, Poland, Ireland, 
Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Estonia. 
Table 1 provides the legend of the variables used in our analysis, while Table 2a 
descriptive statistics for the socio-demographic variables. The sample has 126,013 
observations without missing values. The percentage of females is 56.1 and the mean 
age is 65.2 years. Around 70 percent of sample respondents are married or in a regular 
partnership, and almost 15 percent are widowed. The average number of children is 
2.2 and the average number of grandchildren is 2.6. Retired people are 52.1 percent, 
employed are 28.4 percent, and homemakers are 11.6 percent. Table 2b provides 
descriptive statistics for the life style variables. The Body Mass Index is on average 
26.7, with the percentage of overweight people being 41.7 and that of obese 19.9. The 
percentage of smokers is 19.1 and on average individuals consume alcohol 3.4 days 
per week. The percentage of people who practice sport or other physical activities 
once a week or more is 47.4. Descriptive statistics for objective and subjective health 
indicators are reported in Table 2c. The average of self-reported health satisfaction is 
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3.1, very close to  the “good” level.2 Around half of the respondents suffer from long-
term diseases. The most common disease is hypertension (36.2 percent), followed by 
high blood cholesterol (22.1 percent), arthritis (21.9 percent), and diabetes (11.6). 
 
2.2 Dynamics of the main variables of interest 
 
In what follows we measure the impact of health expenditure on objective health 
measures by looking at the synthetic indicator of the first difference in the reported 
number of chronic diseases. The variable of the reported number of chronic diseases 
is measured in the survey by asking respondents whether they received a doctor’s 
diagnosis on a list of major chronic diseases presented on a show-card in which the 
following 17 chronic conditions are considered: 1) Heart attack; 2) High blood 
pressure or hypertension; 3) High blood cholesterol; 4) Stroke or cerebral vascular 
disease; 5) Diabetes or high blood sugar; 6) Chronic lung diseases; 7) Asthma; 8) 
Arthritis or rheumatism; 9) Osteoporosis; 10) Cancer or malignant tumor; 11) 
Stomach or duodenal ulcer, peptic ulcer; 12) Parkinson disease; 13) Cataracts; 14) 
Hip fracture or femoral fracture; 15) Other fractures; 16) Alzheimer’s; 17) Benign 
tumor. 
Before performing and commenting our econometric estimates we provide a synthetic 
description of the two main variables of interest and of their nexus. Figure 1 (a) 
displays the dynamics of health care expenditure as percentage of GDP in the 19 
surveyed countries over the 2004-2012 period documenting significant cross-sectional 
and time series variability with varying rank across countries during the sample 
period. In particular, while some countries such as Hungary, Poland and Romania 
                                                        
2  The survey uses a standard 1-5 health satisfaction ladder whose values are in 
descending health order “excellent”, “very good”, “good”, “fair” and “poor”. 
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exhibit a quite stable share, other countries such as Denmark (from around 9 to 11 
percent) and Netherlands (from around 9 to 12 percent) have changed significantly 
their health expenditure share over the period 2004-2012. Figure 1 (a) documents that 
country-year values of our relevant indicator have enough variability and that ranking 
across countries displays as well reasonable variation around the sample period. In 
Figure 1 (b) we plot the dynamics of health expenditure per capita which documents a 
significant gap from the lowest (Estonia) to the highest (Switzerland) health per capita 
expenditure country and a relevant time trend, with health expenditure per capita 
reaching in the final sample year (2012) 1,446.6$ per capita in the former against 
6,080$ in the latter. Even though our indicator in the same currency and in PPP and 
year dummies will capture time trend in our econometric estimates it is interesting to 
use both indicators to see whether our findings remain robust given that the health 
expenditure/GDP ratio is much less affected than health per capita expenditure by 
time trends and imperfections in capturing PPPs.  
When looking at levels in the number of chronic diseases reported by respondents we 
find that more than two-thirds of the sample (67.5 percent) declare at least one 
chronic disease, while a sizeable share (18.9 percent) report at least three of them 
(Figure 2 (a)). When looking directly at the first difference of the above variable (the 
change in the number of chronic diseases that will be the dependent variable in the 
econometric analysis which follows) we find as expected a right skewed distribution 
given that health conditions get naturally worse with ageing. The modal value is 
around zero (almost half of the sample, 47.6 percent, report no changes in chronic 
diseases), while the number of those registering one additional disease (20 percent) is 
higher than that of those registering one disease less across two consecutive waves 
(Figure 2 (b)).  
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Figure 3a documents from a descriptive point of view an inverse relationship between 
health expenditure to GDP and the number of chronic diseases. For values of the 
former variables below the 25th percentile the number of chronic diseases is 1.65, 
while falling to 1.19 for those above the 75th percentile. Note that, in case of reverse 
causality between health expenditure to GDP and the number of chronic diseases, we 
would expect a positive and not a negative nexus, with the former growing when the 
latter gets higher. The nexus is negative also when we consider changes and not just 
levels. The value is around 0.22 for values of the health expenditure to GDP ratio 
below the 25th percentile,  while around 0.14 for values above the 75th percentile 
(Figure 3c). Differences in means are significant at 95 percent since confidence 
intervals do not overlap for both levels and first differences. When considering health 
expenditure per capita, the inverse relationships with levels and first differences of the 
number of chronic diseases exhibit similar patterns as shown in Figures 3b and 3d 
respectively. The negative nexus between health expenditure and the change in the 
number of chronic diseases is also confirmed for the healthy individuals (i.e. 
individuals with no chronic diseases ex ante). The change in the number of chronic 
diseases is 0.80 for values of the health expenditure/GDP ratio below the 25th 
percentile, while it is 0.52 for values above the 75th percentile. Similar values (0.80 
and 0.54) are shown for health expenditure per capita below the 25th percentile and 
above the 75th percentile respectively (Figure 3e and 3f). 
 
Significance of descriptive evidence needs to be controlled for the concurring impact 
of other relevant factors. In the econometric analysis presented in the next section we 
test the hypothesis that health expenditure affects changes in health status after 
controlling for a large set of concurring factors. In order to test our hypothesis we 
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regress changes in the number of several chronic diseases on the lagged health 
expenditure share of GDP or, alternatively, on lagged health expenditure per capita. 
 
 
3. Econometric analysis 
 
More specifically, in order to investigate the effect of the health expenditure on health 
status, we estimate the following regression 
 
∆HealthStatusi,t = α HealthExpt-1 + ß SocioDemi,t-1 + γ HealthBehaviori,t-1 
+ δ ∆changesi,t+ ξ DIntYeari + µ HealthStatusi,t-1+ φ HealthQualityi,t-1 + εi,t 
 
where ∆HealthStatusi,t  = HealthStatusi,t - HealthStatusi,t-1 is the first difference in the 
number of chronic diseases and HealthExpt-1 is the national health care expenditure 
provided by all financial agents, measured as percentage of GDP or, alternatively, in 
per capita terms (US$, PPP) in t-1. The SocioDemi,t-1 vector includes socio-
demographic information such as gender, age, years of schooling, marital status, job 
status, number of children and grandchildren and income; HealthBehaviori,t-1 is a 
vector including life style variables such as dummies for drinking, smoking, 
frequency of vigorous physical activities and body mass index related variables such 
as the overweigh/obese status. ∆changesi,t is a vector of variables capturing changes 
between current and previous interview waves in income, marital status, job status, 
life styles or the number of grandchildren. The interview-year dummies are included 
in the vector DIntYeari in order to control for asynchronous survey administration in 
each wave. HealthQualityi,t-1 controls for quality of national health care systems using 
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the rate of avoidable congestive heart failures in hospital, for people aged 15 and 
over, per 100,000 inhabitants (avoidableCHF) which is considered as one of the most 
reliable proxies for NHS quality (Joumard et al., 2010). The lagged health status level 
(the number of chronic diseases at time t-1) is finally introduced to take into account 
the obvious negative relationship between changes and levels of the outcome variable. 
The main variable of interest is the health expenditure/GDP (health expenditure per 
capita)-health outcome gradient, represented by the coefficient α, which measures the 
effect of the health expenditure share to GDP (health expenditure per capita) on the 
first difference in the number of chronic diseases. Standard errors are clustered at 
NUTS2 level in all estimates. 
Table 3a shows that the effect of the health expenditure share of GDP on the first 
difference of the number of chronic diseases is significant. The first specification 
(Table 3a, column 1) includes the basic set of controls, such as socio-demographic 
information and interview-year dummies. We find that a one percent increase in the 
health expenditure/GDP ratio from its mean sample value reduces the change in the 
number of chronic diseases by 0.057. To provide an intuition about the economic 
significance (magnitude) of our effect consider that, if all respondents were ex ante 
without chronic illnesses, with one percent higher health expenditure/GDP ratio, 5.7 
percent of the respondents would not incur in the chronic illness they would have 
contracted otherwise in the next period. Since the ex ante situation is in reality much 
more heterogeneous (individuals without chronic illnesses and individuals with one or 
more chronic illnesses with given probabilities of recovering from them) the effect is 
in reality an average of different forces at work (such as reduced probability of getting 
one or additional chronic illnesses and increased probability of recovering from 
them). 
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The significance of our main finding persists when we augment the benchmark 
specification for changes in socio-demographic indicators (Table 3a, column 2) and 
when we further add health styles (alcohol consumption, smoking, vigorous physical 
activity, and BMI) (Table 3a, column 3) and changes in health styles  (Table 3a, 
column 4). Note that when we introduce health style controls the impact of health 
expenditure to GDP falls to 0.047, because part of the effect is absorbed by the other 
covariates.   
Among the socio-economic variables, we find that the impact of age and education on 
the change in the number of chronic diseases is significant. The relationship between 
age and health status is as expected negative while the negative impact of education is 
well supported by empirical evidence in the literature (see among others Grossman, 
2006). Relational life also matters since being widowed has a positive effect on the 
change in the number of chronic diseases of around 0.17, while finding a partner 
accounts for a 0.25 negative impact on the change in the number of chronic diseases. 
Health behavior is as well of foremost importance since individuals reporting the 
lowest level of physical activity have a 0.179 impact, more than twice as much the 
impact of those reporting even moderate physical activity. The overweight or obese 
status increases the number of chronic diseases in the next period by 0.16 as well. The 
effect of this factor is also confirmed when the changes in lifestyles are included as 
regressors with transition to the overweight/obese status accounting significantly for 
0.013 in explaining the increase of the number of chronic diseases. 
Specifications in columns 5-8 (Table 3a) repeat the first four estimates controlling for 
the quality of health systems using the avoidable heart congestion failure indicator. 
While the number of observations falls the health expenditure to GDP coefficient 
 14 
increases by around 0.03 documenting that the impact of quality adjusted for health 
expenditure is even larger. 
In Table 3b we propose the same specifications of Table 3a corrected for attrition 
bias. This is because, as is well known, not all respondents participate to all waves 
and non responses may be due to death or decision not to respond due to reasons 
related or unrelated to health. The standard approach followed to control for attrition 
is regressing non responses on lagged relevant variables and using the inverse of the 
non response probability score to weight our standard specification. 
More specifically, in order to control for the attrition problem, we estimate the 
following logistic specification  
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑛𝑜𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  ∑ 𝜒𝑣
𝑉−1
𝑣=1
 𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑡_𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑣  + ∑  𝜅𝑔 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑔
𝐺−1
𝑔=1
+  𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where the dependent variable is the probability of not being present in two 
consecutive waves, Sociodem is a set socio-demographic and economic controls 
which includes gender, age, education years, employment and marital status, number 
of children and grandchildren, dummies for health styles (smoking, drinking and 
vigorous physical activities, overweight/obese condition), income, nocondition and 
nosymptoms which are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent reports not 
having specific illnesses or symptoms respectively. Results from this estimate show 
that (female) gender, number of grandchildren and the nocondition variable 
negatively correlate with attrition, while being divorced/separated and doing sport 
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activities infrequently correlate positively with it. These findings suggest that 
worsening of health conditions may be one of the main causes of nonresponses.3 
When doing so we find that the health expenditure to GDP coefficient remains with 
the same magnitude of around 0.1 according to the different considered specifications.  
The magnitude of our final coefficient is not negligible. To give an intuition, 
assuming for simplicity that none of the respondents has chronic diseases ex ante, we 
could say that when we reduce by one percent point the health expenditure/GDP ratio  
one individual out of ten over the ageing population contracts a new chronic disease. 
In the reality part of the sample already has a chronic disease in t-1 and therefore the 
coefficient is a combination of different transitions from and into illnesses which 
produce the combined 0.1 effect. 
The replacement of the health expenditure/GDP variable with health expenditure per 
capita gives as well significant and similar results. In terms of magnitude we start 
from 0.09 effect in Table 4a column 1 for 1,000 dollars of per capita expenditure up 
to 0.15 in column 6 of Table 4a. When we correct our estimates for attrition we find 
that the impact rises to 0.12 in the first column of Table 4b to 0.15 in the last column 
of the Table 4b.  
 
.3.1 Subsample estimates 
 
An important question is whether the impact of health expenditure varies in different 
subsamples. A first thing we expect is that it is higher for the elders. We split our 
sample of individuals aged above 50 into older and younger respondents and find that 
our hypothesis is confirmed. The effect of health expenditure to GDP on our main 
                                                        
3 For a similar approach on the attrition weighting procedure in the literature see, among others, Raab 
et al. (2005), Nicoletti and Peracchi (2005) and Vandecasteele and Debels (2007). 
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policy variable is strongly significant for the older sample. The coefficient for 
individuals aged 65+ is -0.121 (against the overall sample coefficient of -0.095 in the 
corresponding specification) documenting as expected that the impact and importance 
of health expenditure become stronger with ageing.   
Other relevant subsamples where we find a higher significant effect of health 
expenditure on health outcomes are those of females4, the lower education group 
(individuals without a university degree), the low income group (individuals below 
the median income in their country) and the overweight or obese individuals vis-à-vis 
their respective complementary samples (Table 3). 
This implies that some group of individuals are more sensitive to policies for 
increasing health expenditure than others and, as well, related to our life style 
subsample results, that improvements on that direction could save health expenditure 
without negatively affecting health outcomes.  
We however need to check whether our findings are robust when controlling for 
endogeneity. As already discussed the correlation observed in descriptive evidence 
and confirmed by econometric findings goes in a direction which is opposite from 
what reverse causality would predict. We however need to disentangle a possible 
direct causality nexus indicated by our findings from a potential concurring (even 
though weaker) reverse causality effect and from endogeneity caused by third 
unobserved drivers which can cause both variables of interest producing a spurious 
correlation. The issue is of foremost relevance since only if we prove that our findings 
hide a true causality link between health expenditure and health outcomes we can 
                                                        
4 Our findings are consistent on this point with those of Alemayehu and Warner (2004) showing that 
per capita lifetime expenditure is $316,600 is a third higher for females ($361,200) than males 




draw the policy conclusion that, coeteris paribus, increasing health expenditure is 
desirable in order to improve health outcomes. 
 
3.2 Instrumental variable results 
 
The almost insurmountable problem in finding instruments is related to their validity 
more than to their relevance. While it is not difficult to find third drivers which are 
correlated with the variable we want to instrument, it is not easy to postulate that such 
variables do not correlate directly with the dependent variable of our estimate. In 
order to solve the problem in our specific case we propose an instrument drawn from 
the parliament political composition. The latter is expected to influence decisions on 
public and private expenditure but may be hardly be suspected to affect directly health 
outcomes of the individuals in our sample (i.e. it is hard to conceive that insurgence, 
persistence and/or recovery from illnesses ranging from cancer, Parkinson and 
arthritis may be affected by the share of members of a given party).  More 
specifically, in terms of validity of our instrument, we expect that the share of left 
wing party members is significantly associated with health expenditure given the 
longstanding tradition of such party in being sensitive to satisfy this issue in its 
political programs. This is because most health expenditure is public expenditure 
(around 74 percent in our sample) and political parties of the left are more likely to 
increase the budget on this point in order to improve wellbeing of the low income 
population which is generally an important part of their constituencies and due to their 
higher sensitivity for equity concerns (or at least to address equity concerns with 
public expenditure). Our assumption find ample support in the literature. To quote 
just some examples Immergut (1992: 1) describes how politicians implement different 
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health policies and comes to the following conclusion: “National health insurance 
symbolizes the great divide between liberalism and socialism, between the free 
market and the planned economy... Political parties look to national health insurance 
programs as a vivid expression of their distinctive ideological profiles and as an 
effective means of getting votes National health insurance, in sum, is a highly 
politicized issue.” De Donder and Hindricks (2007) examine the political economy of 
social insurance policy and demonstrate that in a two party model, the left wing party 
proposes more social insurance than the right wing party. The right wing party attracts 
the richer individuals, and those with smaller health risks, and the left wing party 
attracts the poorer individuals, and those with higher health risks. (Potrafke, 2010). 
From an empirical point of view Herwartz and Theilen (2014) find confirmation that 
if governments are sufficiently long in power, right-wing governments spend less on 
public health than their left-wing counterparts.5 
By considering the presence of some hysteresis in current health expenditure 
decisions we use the following three year moving average 
Partyt=1/3*(partyt+0.9 partyt-1 + 0.8 partyt-2) 
where party represents the share of left wing parliament members.6 Moreover, since 
we instrument the health expenditure at time t-1, we lag the final year of our three-
year moving average by two periods considering that current parliament decision 
affects the next year health expenditure.  
                                                        
5 Literature on how parliament composition affects health expenditure documents also a positive and 
significant correlation between health expenditure and election years, suggesting that parliaments 
increase health expenditure in order to be re-elected. Therefore we have also used as instrument the 
years of elections finding very similar results with respect to those shown in what follows. Evidence is 
omitted and available upon request.  
6 We perform robustness check on the number of years considered in the moving average by adding 
one/two years and slightly finding weights. We find that our results are almost unaffected. Evidence is 
omitted and available upon request. 
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Empirical evidence documents that the relevance of our instrument is quite strong. 
Both health expenditure to GDP and health expenditure per capita are significantly 
and positively correlated with the share of left wing parliamentarian members. More 
specifically we find in pairwise correlations that health expenditure to GDP has a 
correlation coefficient of 0.31 with the share of left wing members, while health per 
capita expenditure of 0.53. Correlation with other parliament groups is much weaker 
or in opposite direction. In particular, the correlation coefficient of health expenditure 
to GDP  with the share of centre-left and centre-right members is respectively 0.08, -
0.22 and the respective correlation coefficients of health expenditure per capita are -
0.04, -0.39. 
The second-stage findings of the IV estimate which uses the above described 
instrument confirm the significance of the country health variables (Table 6). 
In terms of economic significance what is impressive is as well the stability of health 
coefficients estimated with IV which are quite similar to those found in non 
instrumented estimates. More specifically a one percent increase in the health 
expenditure/GDP ratio produces an effect of 0.135 in terms of changes in the number 
of chronic diseases, while 1000 US$ of health expenditure per capita an effect of 0.19 
(Table 6). 
IV estimates performed on subsamples indicate that the impact of health expenditure 
on the number of chronic diseases remains significant only on the more vulnerable 
groups (Table 7). More specifically we find a significant impact on the elders (0.185 
on respondents aged above 65), on females (0.142), on the low educated group (0.15) 
and on those who do not practice physical activity. The pattern of the effects of health  
expenditure per capita exhibit similar variability. 
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3.3 Robustness check with collapsed NUTS2 level data 
 
As discussed in the introduction the use of individual level data enriches the analysis 
of the impact of health expenditure on health outcomes allowing us to take properly 
into account a large set of factors whose variability would be sacrificed when 
averaging at aggregate level. We must however wonder whether the significance of 
our country level variable of interest is excessively enhanced by individual level 
observations (which basically multiply degrees of freedom for health/GDP values 
which vary only at territorial level) and if it depends on some country level outliers. 
Our robustness check in this respect consists in reducing drastically the number of 
observations by collapsing our database at NUTS2 level and then re-estimating our 
main specification. Even though being aware of all the limitations in this type of 
analysis with collapsed data as described in section 1.2, robustness of our findings to 
this approach may reinforce the validity of our results (Table 8).  
Empirical evidence on collapsed dat show that the health expenditure to GDP ratio is 
still negative and significant with a remarkably similar magnitude (Table 8), and a 
similar result is found for the health expenditure per capita variable. More specifically 
the health expenditure/GDP and the health per capita coefficients are respectively 
equal to 0.14 and 0.27 (per 1,000 US$) in the NUTS2 level estimates. 
In a last robustness check we perform IV estimates using the instrument of the share 
of left wing parliamentarian members on our data collapsed at NUTS2 level. Again 
the health variables are significant in the expected direction and coefficients are still 
slightly higher in magnitude for the health/GDP ratio (0.17) while smaller for the 
health per capita ratio (0.23). Note that 1,000 US$ per inhabitant are around three 
times one percent of the  health/GDP ratios if we use Italy as a reference country. The 
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value is higher(lower) for lower(higher) per capita income countries in the sample. It 
is therefore reasonable that the health per capita coefficient is higher than the 
health/GDP ratio coefficient. We finally repeat our analysis with (non IV and IV) 
estimates on those subsamples which provided significant IV estimates on individual 
level data in Table 7 and find that patterns found in the non collapsed estimates are 
substantially confirmed even though significance varies (Table 8 and Table 9). 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
If health expenditure to GDP affects mortality and longevity in country level data, as 
postulated and tested by the current literature, the nexus must pass through a 
relationship between health expenditure to GDP and changes in the number of chronic 
diseases at individual level which can exhibit a certain degree of heterogeneity across 
different population subgroups. The analysis of the latter is the goal of our paper.  Our 
original contribution to the literature stands as well in the combination of individual 
and territorial level data. We explain in the paper why such combination enriches the 
analysis and provides additional insights to our knowledge on the topics. 
We provide evidence with both individual level and territorial level data that health 
expenditure to GDP and health expenditure per capita have a negative and significant 
impact on changes in the number of chronic diseases which is remarkably stable also 
in terms of economic significance for the health expenditure/GDP ratio under the 
different estimation approaches adopted in the paper. The effect of the variable is not 
homogeneous and is more relevant for the elders, for females, for the 
overweight/obese, for the below median income group and for the less educated vis-à-
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vis their complementary samples. Two are the main implications of these subsample 
findings. First, these specific groups may be more interested and exert more political 
pressure for higher health expenditure. Second (concerning life style subsample 
findings), active ageing policies increasing education and reducing the population 
exposure to excess weight may allow to save health expenditure without adversely 
affecting health outcomes. 
 From a methodological point of view our contribution innovates the existing 
literature by proposing a solution in our work to the endogeneity problem in the 
health expenditure/health outcomes nexus by using the political composition of the 
parliament.  We finally document that our findings are robust when we collapse our 
sample at territorial level thereby documenting that our analysis can replicate and 
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Table 1. Variables Legend  
Variable Description 
Age Respondent’s age 
Ageclass (0/1dummies for the following age groups) Age 55-59; Age 60-64; Age 65-69; Age 70-74; Age 75-79 
Avoidablechf 
avoidable congestive heart failure hospital admission rate of people aged 15 and over per 100,000 
inhabitants 
Bmi_mod Body mass index (easySHARE version) 
Bmi2_mod Dummy variables: underweight, normal, overwheit, obese. 
Country country identifier 
Divorced Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is divorced 
Drinking Variables Dummy variables: Drink 5or6days a week; Drink 3or4days a week; Drink 1or2 a week; Drink 1or2 a 
month; Drink <1 a month; Not Drink for 3 months  
Eduyears years of education 
Employed Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is employed 
Female Dummy variable = 1 if the respondent’s gender is female and 0 otherwise. 0 otherwise 
Gets_Divorced Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got divorced 
Gets_Grandchildren Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got grandchildren 
Gets_Partnership Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got a new partner 
Gets_Retired Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got retired 
Gets_Separated Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got separated 
Gets_Unemployed Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got unemployed 
Gets_Widowed Dummy variable=1 if the respondent got widowed 
Getshelpfromoutside Dummy variable=1 if the respondent  
Health_Satisfaction Self-perceived health status: 1=excellent, 2=very good; 3=good;4=fair; 5=poor 
Healthexpgdp Share of health expenditure to GDP 
Homemaker   
Improvesport Dummy variable=1 if the respondent increased physical activity last year 
Logincome Ln of household total gross income. Its value is equal to the sum over all household members of the 
individual-level values of: annual net income from employment and self-employment (in the previous 
year); Annual public old age/early or pre-retirement/disability pension (or sickness benefits); Annual 
public unemployment benefit or insurance, public survivor pension from partner; Annual war pension, 
private (occupational) old age/early retirement/disability pension, private (occupational) survivor 
pension from partner's job, public old age supplementary pension/public old age/public disability 
second pension, secondary public survivor pension from spouse or partner, occupational old age 
pension from a second and third job; Annual public and private long-term insurance payments; Annual 
life insurance payment, private annuity or private personal pension, private health insurance payment, 
alimony, payments from charities received; Income from rent. Values of the following household level 
variables are added: Annual other hhd members' net income; Annual other hhd members' net income 
from other sources; Household bank accounts, government and corporate bonds, stocks/shares; mutual 
funds. 
Married Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is married  
N_Children number of children 
N_Chronicdeseases number of chronic diseases  
N_Doctorvisits how often seen or talked to medical doctor last 12 months 
N_Grandchildren number of grandchildren 
None Dummy variable=1 if the doctor told you had: none. 0 otherwise 
Other_Job Dummy variable=1 if the respondent has a second job 
Overweight_Obese 
Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is overweight (29.9<BMI<34.9 ) or obese (BMI>34.9). 0 
otherwise 
Reducedrinking Dummy variable=1 if the respondent reduced drinking habits last year 
Reg_Partnership Dummy variable=1 if the respondent has a registered partnership 
Retired Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is retired 
Separated Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is separated 
Vig_Activity Frequency of sports or vigorous activities (0/1 dummies): Min1week, Oneweek, OneorThreemonth, 
Hardly_ever_never 
Widowed Dummy variable=1 if the respondent is widowed 
 
 
Table 2a. Descriptive statistics for socio-demographic variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female 126013 0.561 0.496 0 1 
Age 125609 65.217 10.446 50 104.3 
Ageclass 
     55-59 125609 0.178 0.382 0 1 
60-64 125609 0.175 0.380 0 1 
65-69 125609 0.153 0.360 0 1 
70-74 125609 0.130 0.336 0 1 
 26 
75-79 125609 0.100 0.300 0 1 
>80 125609 0.116 0.321 0 1 
Eduyears 125609 7.640 9.019 0 25 
Married 124674 0.699 0.459 0 1 
Registered_partnershipp 124674 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Separated 124674 0.012 0.108 0 1 
Divorced 124674 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Widowed 124674 0.146 0.354 0 1 
Retired 124549 0.521 0.500 0 1 
Employed 124549 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Homemaker 124549 0.116 0.321 0 1 
Other_job 124549 0.010 0.098 0 1 
N_children 125149 2.223 1.460 0 17 
N_grandchildren 124666 2.600 3.217 0 25 
Income 122304 71,742.04 147421.90 0 4,865,798 
∆N_chronic_diseases 40029 0.124 1.167 -9 8 
N_chronic_diseases 125314 1.358 1.371 0 10 
 
 
Table 2b. Descriptive statistics for health behavior 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Drinking 124687 3.386 2.231 1 7 
Almost_every_day 124687 0.330 0.470 0 1 
5or6days_week 124687 0.099 0.299 0 1 
3or4days_week 124687 0.114 0.317 0 1 
1or2_week 124687 0.173 0.378 0 1 
1or2_month 124687 0.068 0.253 0 1 
<1_month 124687 0.027 0.161 0 1 
0_in_3months 124687 0.189 0.391 0 1 
VigActivity 124676 2.615 1.335 1 4 
>1_week 124676 0.340 0.474 0 1 
1_week 124676 0.137 0.344 0 1 
1to3_month 124676 0.091 0.287 0 1 
Hardlyever_never 124676 0.432 0.495 0 1 
Smoking 125014 0.191 0.393 0 1 
BMI 121243 26.684 4.580 12 88 
BMI_group 121243 2.801 0.764 1 4 
Underweight 121243 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Normal 121243 0.371 0.483 0 1 
Overweight 121243 0.417 0.493 0 1 
Obese 121243 0.199 0.399 0 1 
 
 




Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
N_chronic_diseases   
    
1 125314 0.299 0.458 0 1 
2 125314 0.191 0.393 0 1 
3 125314 0.105 0.307 0 1 
4 125314 0.049 0.215 0 1 
5 125314 0.020 0.142 0 1 
6 125314 0.007 0.085 0 1 
7 125314 0.002 0.048 0 1 
8 125314 0.001 0.025 0 1 
9 125314 0.001 0.012 0 1 
10 125314 7.98e-06 0.003 0 1 
None 125314 0.248 0.432 0 1 
Azheimer 94670 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Arhritis 125314 0.219 0.413 0 1 
Asthma 125314 0.029 0.169 0 1 
Benign_tumor 94670 0.012 0.109 0 1 
Cancer 125314 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Cataracts 125314 0.079 0.27 0 1 
Chronic_lung_disease 125314 0.057 0.232 0 1 
 27 
Diabetes_or_highbloodsugar 125314 0.116 0.32 0 1 
Heart_attack 125314 0.131 0.337 0 1 
Highblood_cholesterol 125314 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Highbloodpressure_hypertension 125314 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Hiporfemoral_fracture 125314 0.022 0.146 0 1 
Osteoporosis 125314 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Other_conditions 125314 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Other_fractures 94670 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Parkinson 125314 0.007 0.084 0 1 
Stomachorduodenalorpeptic_ulcer 125314 0.055 0.228 0 1 
Stroke 125314 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Health satisfaction 125369 3.132 1.095 1 5 
 
Figure 1. Dynamics of health expenditure to GDP (a) and health expenditure per 





Figures 2. The distribution of the number of chronic diseases (a) and of changes 














Figures 3a – 3f. Levels and first differences of the number of chronic diseases for 
the extremes of health expenditure 
 
Figure 3a. Number of chronic diseases for the extremes of the 
health expenditure/GDP distribution. 
 
Figure 3b. Number of chronic diseases for the extremes of the 
health expenditure per capita distribution. 
 
Figure 3c. Change in the number of chronic diseases for the 
extremes of the health expenditure/GDP distribution. 
 
Figure 3d. Change in the number of chronic diseases for the 
extremes of the health expenditure per capita distribution. 
 
Figure 3e. Change in the number of chronic diseases for the 
extremes of the health expenditure/GDP distribution 
(individuals with no chronic diseases ex ante). 
 
Figure 3f. Change in the number of chronic diseases for the 
extremes of the health expenditure per capita distribution 




Table 3a. The effect of health expenditure to GDP on changes in the number of chronic diseases 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables         
                  
HealthExp/GDP t-1 
Healthexpgdp_lastwave 
-0.0572*** -0.0596*** -0.0478** -0.0470** -0.0831*** -0.0889*** -0.0728*** -0.0738*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0233) (0.0229) 
Female t-1 0.0209 0.0245 0.0285* 0.0245 0.0180 0.0274 0.0295 0.0310 
 
(0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0200) 
Age55-59 t-1 0.0953*** 0.0934*** 0.0913*** 0.0867*** 0.0849*** 0.0851*** 0.0847*** 0.0817*** 
 
(0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0250) (0.0264) (0.0261) (0.0271) 
Age60-64 t-1 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.130*** 0.150*** 0.146*** 0.152*** 0.143*** 
 
(0.0275) (0.0296) (0.0269) (0.0280) (0.0358) (0.0388) (0.0350) (0.0371) 
Age65-69 t-1 0.202*** 0.191*** 0.201*** 0.186*** 0.195*** 0.183*** 0.199*** 0.182*** 
 
(0.0325) (0.0334) (0.0331) (0.0343) (0.0455) (0.0451) (0.0462) (0.0466) 
Age70-74 t-1 0.267*** 0.250*** 0.266*** 0.237*** 0.309*** 0.290*** 0.312*** 0.280*** 
 
(0.0412) (0.0414) (0.0424) (0.0428) (0.0432) (0.0439) (0.0452) (0.0463) 
Age75-79 t-1 0.322*** 0.294*** 0.325*** 0.287*** 0.334*** 0.303*** 0.343*** 0.299*** 
 
(0.0494) (0.0487) (0.0508) (0.0512) (0.0646) (0.0638) (0.0666) (0.0676) 
Age_above 80 t-1 0.295*** 0.274*** 0.286*** 0.249*** 0.283*** 0.260*** 0.294*** 0.249*** 
 
(0.0490) (0.0488) (0.0502) (0.0504) (0.0671) (0.0660) (0.0701) (0.0699) 
Eduyears t-1 -0.0124*** -0.0121*** -0.00992*** -0.00951*** -0.0113*** -0.0105*** -0.00843*** -0.00760*** 
 
(0.00219) (0.00216) (0.00213) (0.00207) (0.00302) (0.00292) (0.00294) (0.00274) 
N_children t-1 -0.0178** -0.0158** -0.0203** -0.0186** -0.0187** -0.0149* -0.0228** -0.0193** 
 
(0.00751) (0.00775) (0.00791) (0.00844) (0.00882) (0.00874) (0.00918) (0.00938) 
N_grandchildren t-1 0.00178 0.00200 0.00112 0.00126 0.00559 0.00585 0.00573 0.00532 
 
(0.00442) (0.00442) (0.00461) (0.00483) (0.00455) (0.00451) (0.00463) (0.00467) 
Retired t-1 -0.0243 -0.0114 -0.0141 0.00250 -0.0198 -0.00335 -0.0122 0.0150 
 
(0.0450) (0.0494) (0.0442) (0.0484) (0.0604) (0.0644) (0.0602) (0.0633) 
Employed t-1 -0.152*** -0.149*** -0.132*** -0.125*** -0.175*** -0.170*** -0.160*** -0.145*** 
 
(0.0358) (0.0390) (0.0349) (0.0380) (0.0422) (0.0464) (0.0414) (0.0457) 
Homemaker t-1 -0.0429 -0.0426 -0.0379 -0.0403 -0.0409 -0.0452 -0.0410 -0.0468 
 
(0.0441) (0.0468) (0.0414) (0.0442) (0.0534) (0.0566) (0.0496) (0.0530) 
Other_job t-1 -0.480*** -0.342** -0.466*** -0.357** -0.519** -0.337* -0.494** -0.314 
 
(0.163) (0.156) (0.160) (0.161) (0.205) (0.200) (0.203) (0.203) 
Divorced t-1 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.154*** 0.165*** 0.167** 0.167** 0.176*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0490) (0.0516) (0.0518) (0.0625) (0.0633) (0.0645) (0.0648) 
Married t-1 0.0530* 0.0514* 0.0580* 0.0637** 0.0404 0.0408 0.0413 0.0516 
 
(0.0288) (0.0298) (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0397) (0.0411) (0.0414) (0.0423) 
 30 
Separated t-1 0.0354 0.0695 0.0520 0.0574 0.0448 0.0726 0.0475 0.0340 
 
(0.0909) (0.0886) (0.0900) (0.0905) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) 
Reg_partnership t-1 0.00781 0.0118 0.0169 0.0353 -0.0394 -0.0321 -0.0331 -0.00102 
 
(0.0549) (0.0566) (0.0553) (0.0564) (0.0649) (0.0676) (0.0661) (0.0659) 
Widowed t-1 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0380) (0.0487) (0.0498) (0.0493) (0.0493) 
Ln(Income)t-1 0.0160 0.0141 0.0255* 0.0254* 0.0317* 0.0288 0.0416** 0.0396** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0189) (0.0183) (0.0193) (0.0184) 
Δ Ln(Income) 0.0143 0.0154* 0.0160* 0.0171* 0.0264** 0.0266** 0.0271** 0.0270** 
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-0.0199 
    
(0.0319) 
   
(0.0491) 
ΔBmi_mod 
   
0.0132*** 
   
0.0116** 
    
(0.00463) 











































































































































N_ChronicDeseases t-1 -0.397*** -0.398*** -0.413*** -0.415*** -0.433*** -0.435*** -0.450*** -0.453*** 
 
(0.0168) (0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0163) 
AvoidableCHF  
    
0.000384 0.000345 0.000380 0.000286 
     
(0.000382) (0.000373) (0.000378) (0.000360) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,294 15,980 15,927 15,507 10,853 10,650 10,551 10,266 
R-squared 0.198 0.200 0.208 0.210 0.216 0.220 0.226 0.231 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3b. The effect of health expenditure to GDP on changes in the number of chronic diseases (correction for attrition bias) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables         
                  
HealthExp/GDP t-1 
_lastwave 
-0.0532** -0.0563** -0.0452* -0.0450** -0.0985*** -0.106*** -0.0927*** -0.0945*** 
 
(0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0225) (0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0266) (0.0259) 
AvoidableCHF No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Observations 15,722 15,578 15,647 15,507 10,406 10,318 10,351 10,266 
R-squared 0.183 0.186 0.193 0.199 0.206 0.211 0.216 0.224 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Each column displays the health expenditure/GDP coefficient in a specification which corresponds to that of the same Table 1A column 
 
 
Table 4a. The effect of per capita health expenditure on changes in the number of chronic diseases 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables         
                  
HealthExpPerCapita t-1 
_lastwave 
-9.25e-05*** -9.42e-05*** -8.10e-05** -7.21e-05** -0.000140*** -0.000149*** -0.000123*** -0.000122*** 
 
(3.46e-05) (3.49e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.29e-05) (4.25e-05) (4.29e-05) (4.14e-05) (4.04e-05) 
AvoidableCHF No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Observations 16,294 15,980 15,927 15,507 10,853 10,650 10,551 10,266 
R-squared 0.198 0.200 0.208 0.210 0.216 0.219 0.226 0.230 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        Each column displays the health expenditure per capita coefficient in a specification which corresponds to that of the same Table 1A column (with the exception of the health per capita 
coefficient which replaces health expenditure/GDP coefficient). 
 
 
Table 4b. The effect of per capita health expenditure on changes in the number of chronic diseases (correction for attrition bias) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables         
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HealthExpPerCapita t-1 
_lastwave 
-0.000117*** -0.000121*** -0.000108*** -0.000101*** -0.000163*** -0.000174*** -0.000155*** -0.000155*** 
 
(3.89e-05) (3.87e-05) (3.87e-05) (3.77e-05) (4.77e-05) (4.76e-05) (4.63e-05) (4.49e-05) 
AvoidableCHF No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Observations 15,722 15,578 15,647 15,507 10,406 10,318 10,351 10,266 
R-squared 0.184 0.187 0.193 0.200 0.206 0.211 0.217 0.224 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
        
Each column displays the health expenditure per capita coefficient in a specification which corresponds to that of the same Table 1A column (with the exception of the health per capita 
coefficient which replaces health expenditure/GDP coefficient). 
 
 
Table 5. The effect of health expenditure on changes in the number of chronic diseases (for subsamples). 
 
 
Health exp to GDP St. Dev. R-squared Health exp per capita St. Dev. R-squared Observations 
All sample -0.0945*** (0.0259) 0.224 -0.000155*** (4.49e-05) 0.224 10,266 
Elder 65+ -0.121*** (0.0314) 0.232 -0.000200*** (5.47e-05) 0.232 5,355 
Female -0.0968*** (0.0306) 0.226 -0.000149*** (5.14e-05) 0.225 5,650 
Physical activity -0.115*** (0.0255) 0.238 -0.000189*** (4.08e-05) 0.238 5,120 
Lack of physical activity -0.0666* (0.0396) 0.225 -0.000102 (7.24e-05) 0.225 4,260 
High income -0.0533* (0.0278) 0.227 -9.26e-05* (4.79e-05) 0.227 4,642 
Low income -0.124*** (0.0283) 0.232 -0.000201*** (5.03e-05) 0.232 5,622 
No overweight -0.0754** (0.0324) 0.221 -0.000128** (6.03e-05) 0.221 4,144 
Overweight -0.106*** (0.0293) 0.232 -0.000172*** (4.91e-05) 0.232 6,122 
Low education -0.0971*** (0.0285) 0.218 -0.000157*** (4.89e-05) 0.218 7,990 
High education -0.0915** (0.0356) 0.279 -0.000150** (6.57e-05) 0.279 2,276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Each column displays the health expenditure per capita coefficient in a specification which corresponds to that of the same Table 1.A column (with the exception of the health per capita 
coefficient which replaces health expenditure/GDP coefficient). Elder 60+: individuals aged above 60; high income: individuals with income above country median; Low income: individuals 
with income below country median; Low education: individuals without graduate degree; High education: individuals with graduate degree.  
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Table 6. Instrumental variable estimates  
 
  (1) (2) 
Variables   
      









Female t-1 0.0451* 0.0446* 
 
(0.0242) (0.0242) 
Age55-59 t-1 0.0576** 0.0608** 
 
(0.0270) (0.0274) 
Age60-64 t-1 0.131*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.0320) (0.0323) 
Age65-69 t-1 0.161*** 0.168*** 
 
(0.0443) (0.0439) 
Age70-74 t-1 0.254*** 0.262*** 
 
(0.0462) (0.0450) 
Age75-79 t-1 0.256*** 0.265*** 
 
(0.0675) (0.0666) 
Age_above 80 t-1 0.201*** 0.211*** 
 
(0.0648) (0.0646) 
Eduyears t-1 -0.00594* -0.00665** 
 
(0.00329) (0.00323) 
N_children t-1 -0.0208* -0.0201* 
 
(0.0110) (0.0108) 
N_grandchildren t-1 0.00577 0.00570 
 
(0.00539) (0.00533) 
Retired t-1 0.0947 0.0873 
 
(0.0712) (0.0704) 
Employed t-1 -0.0886 -0.0914 
 
(0.0561) (0.0563) 
Homemaker t-1 -0.00669 -0.0107 
 
(0.0584) (0.0584) 
Other_job t-1 -0.185 -0.184 
 
(0.183) (0.184) 
Divorced t-1 0.244*** 0.243*** 
 
(0.0767) (0.0760) 
Married t-1 0.0594 0.0557 
 
(0.0491) (0.0492) 
Separated t-1 0.0877 0.0825 
 
(0.131) (0.132) 
Reg_partnership t-1 -0.0457 -0.0375 
 
(0.0627) (0.0623) 
Widowed t-1 0.174*** 0.167*** 
 
(0.0545) (0.0542) 
Ln(Income)t-1 0.0434*** 0.0511*** 
 
(0.0163) (0.0162) 
Δ Ln(Income) 0.0293** 0.0316*** 
 
(0.0118) (0.0120) 
Drinking5or6days_a_week t-1 -0.0187 -0.0197 
 
(0.0487) (0.0482) 
Drinking3or4days_a_week t-1 0.0547 0.0526 
 
(0.0513) (0.0511) 
Drinking1or2_a_week t-1 -0.0587 -0.0606 
 
(0.0405) (0.0405) 
Drinking 1or2_a_month t-1 0.0139 0.0104 
 
(0.0570) (0.0564) 
Drinking <1_a_month t-1 -0.0626 -0.0682 
 
(0.0857) (0.0850) 
NotDrinking_for_3_months t-1 -0.0414 -0.0464 
 
(0.0350) (0.0345) 
VigActivity1_week t-1 0.0677** 0.0673** 
 
(0.0276) (0.0274) 
VigActivity 1or3_a_month t-1 0.110*** 0.110*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0354) 




Smoking t-1 -0.00982 -0.0116 
 
(0.0363) (0.0356) 
OverweightOrObese t-1 0.177*** 0.176*** 
 
(0.0240) (0.0241) 
ReduceDrinking 0.0516* 0.0516* 
 
(0.0277) (0.0276) 
ImproveSport -0.201*** -0.200*** 
 
(0.0299) (0.0300) 
Δ smoking -0.0579 -0.0592 
 
(0.0528) (0.0526) 
ΔBmi_mod 0.0130** 0.0129** 
 
(0.00582) (0.00582) 
GetsSeparated -0.132 -0.142 
 
(0.283) (0.284) 
GetsWidowed 0.159** 0.155** 
 
(0.0749) (0.0747) 
GetsDivorced -0.101 -0.0988 
 
(0.122) (0.124) 
GetsPartnership -0.468*** -0.450*** 
 
(0.170) (0.167) 
ΔHelpFromOutside 0.0500 0.0487 
 
(0.0435) (0.0431) 
GetsRetired 0.0398 0.0366 
 
(0.0493) (0.0499) 
GetsUnemployed 0.0108 0.00870 
 
(0.0899) (0.0879) 
GetsGrandchildren -0.0249 -0.0253 
 
(0.0243) (0.0242) 
N_ChronicDeseases t-1 -0.442*** -0.442*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0176) 
AvoidableCHF  -0.000168 -1.48e-05 
 
(0.000645) (0.000528) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   Observations 10,266 10,266 
R-squared 0.224 0.224 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Instrumental variable estimates for subsamples  
 
 Health exp/GDP  R-squared Health exp per capita  R-squared Obs 
Elder 65+ -0.185** (0.0845) 0.231 -0.000261** (0.000110) 0.231 5,355 
Female -0.142* (0.0807) 0.225 -0.000194* (0.000106) 0.225 5,650 
Physical activity -0.108* (0.0570) 0.238 -0.000144* (7.34e-05) 0.238 5,120 
Lack of physical activity -0.427* (0.241) 0.195 -0.000566** (0.000284) 0.207 4,260 
High income -0.115 (0.0726) 0.226 -0.000155* (9.02e-05) 0.226 4,642 
Low income -0.144** (0.0714) 0.232 -0.000209** (9.85e-05) 0.232 5,622 
No overweight -0.132 (0.0924) 0.220 -0.000177 (0.000116) 0.221 4,144 
Overweight -0.137** (0.0605) 0.232 -0.000192** (7.96e-05) 0.232 6,122 
Low education -0.151** (0.0713) 0.217 -0.000210** (9.28e-05) 0.218 7,990 
High education -0.0831 (0.0931) 0.279 -0.000106 (0.000119) 0.279 2,276 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Subgroup legend: see  Table 5. 
 
 
Table 8. The impact of health expenditure to GDP and health expenditure per capita on NUTS2 level collapsed data (subsample) 
 
 
Health exp/GDP St. Dev. R-squared Health exp per capita St. Dev. R-squared 
All -0.135*** (0.0471) 0.742 -0.000269*** (8.48e-05) 0.749 
Female -0.182*** (0.0551) 0.764 -0.000343*** (0.000101) 0.767 
Elder 65+ -0.158** (0.0681) 0.553 -0.000286** (0.000123) 0.553 
Lack of physical activity -0.119* (0.0647) 0.621 -0.000176 (0.000120) 0.612 
Low income -0.0520 (0.0518) 0.712 -0.000136 (9.02e-05) 0.718 
Overweight -0.120** (0.0576) 0.672 -0.000272*** (9.55e-05) 0.692 
Low Education -0.154** (0.0639) 0.710 -0.000250** (0.000116) 0.704 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 










R-squared Health exp per capita 
 
R-squared 
All -0.170** (0.0738) 0.649 -0.000229** (0.000101) 0.642 
Female -0.233*** (0.0724) 0.749 -0.000326*** (9.98e-05) 0.755 
Elder 65+ -0.174** (0.0704) 0.551 -0.000262** (0.000106) 0.552 
Lack of physical activity -0.148* (0.0865) 0.615 -0.000217* (0.000128) 0.606 
Low income -0.127* (0.0688) 0.675 -0.000180* (9.57e-05) 0.684 
Overweight -0.181*** (0.0694) 0.634 -0.000250*** (9.51e-05) 0.651 
Low Education -0.204** (0.0964) 0.637 -0.000247** (0.000120) 0.622 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Subgroup legend: see  Table 5. 
 
